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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT E. ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 15571 
DIONNE BRADLEY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries suffered by a 
pedestrian when he was struck down by defendant's automobile 
within a marked crosswalk. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury which found that plaintiff 
and defendant were equally negligent, resulting in a verdict 
and judgment for the defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and remand for 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early evening of February 7, 1976, Robert Anderson, 
plaintiff-appellant, was crossing Sunnyside Avenue at Guardsman 
Way en route to a movie at the University of Utah. There were 
no traffic control lights at the crossing. He was in a marked 
crosswalk, walking from south to north, and was within about 
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6 feet of the north curb when he was struck by an automobile 
driven by Dionne Bradley, the defendant,and thrown several 
feet (Ex. 1-P, R 155), landing at the side of the road, 
partly in the roadway and partly on the sidewalk. He was 
taken by paramedics to the University Hospital, where he was 
to be confined in bed for the next two months (R 302). 
When admitted to the hospital, plaintiff was unconscious, 
had obvious injuries to both legs in the region of the 
thigh, plus multiple bruises, and injuries to his head. He 
remained in intensive care for several days and was ulti-
mately transferred to the general ward (R 295). 
Both of plaintiff's thigh bones were fractured. The 
fracture of the left leg was comminuted, with one large 
piece and some smaller pieces knocked off the bone. It was 
necessary to treat this fracture with a pin through the 
upper end of the shin bone and the leg in traction to keep 
it relatively straight (R 296) . The injury to the right leg 
was higher, near the hip, and the bone was completely broken 
with piercing of the skin, an open fracture. Surgery was 
necessary to insert an intermedullary nail to keep the bone 
in place, the nail being driven in from the top of the hip 
bone down through the shaft across the fracture site, and 
far enough that the nail fit snuggly inside the bone (R 299). 
While plaintiff was in the hospital, infection developed 
in one of the legs, requiring treatment with antibiotics, 
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and he was in traction for about six weeks of his stay in 
the hospital, after which time he was given physical therapy 
until his release from the hospital on April 7 (R 302). 
After his release from the hospital, pulmonary embolism, 
which was a result of the fractures, necessitated his being 
hospitalized again for more than a week (R 303). His leg 
was in a cast until July 4, some five months after the 
accident, and he suffered permanent disability (R 209, 252). 
As a result of the injuries and the resulting disabil-
ities and treatment, plaintiff incurred costs at the University 
of Utah Medical Center in the amount of $12,798.94, at 
University Radiology Associates for $504.50, and miscell-
aneous costs of $2,660.48, or total expenses of $15,963.92 
(Exs. 22-P and 23-P). 
The case was submitted to the jury on a general verdict 
with special interrogatories, which resulted in a verdict 
and judgment of no cause of action, the jury having found 
that plaintiff and defendant were equally negligent. The 
trial court denied a motion for a new trial, and this appeal 
was taken. 
ARGUMENT 
The jury's finding that plaintiff and defendant were each 
50% negligent is contrary to the evidence and wrong as a matter 
- 3 -
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of law; and the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial 
was an abuse of discretion. 
The enactment of the Comparative Negligence Law, 78-27-37 
et seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953, requires some reconsideration 
of the roles of trial and appellate judges in controlling 
errant jurors, particulary with reference to their findings 
as to the relative degrees of negligence of the parties. 
A comparative negligence trial differs markedly from one 
involving common law contributory negligence. Under the prior 
practice, a motion for a directed verdict was available to test 
the issues of negligence and contributory negligence in the 
first instance. The judge could decide, in some cases, whether 
there was sufficient evidence for a finding of negligence, 
on the one hand, or contributory negligence, on the other. 
In a comparative negligence case, however, it seems to be 
almost out of the question for the trial judge to direct the 
jury on apportionment. Even if he were convinced that the 
plaintiff was entitled to recover, it would not be his function 
to arrive at percentage figures. To do so would subvert the 
system. It is the jury's function to determine, within 
limits, the percentage of negligence attributable to each. 
Accordingly, the trial judge must assume his supervisory role 
through the granting or denying of motions for a new trial. 
The present case is a classic example of a jury gone 
wrong, and a trial judge's failure to exercise that super-
- 4 -
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vision essential to the proper administration of justice. It 
is not a case in which there was serious disagreement as to 
how an accident happened. It is a case in which the court 
should have set aside a clearly erroneous determination. 
Review of the evidence is necessary, but that relating 
to the accident itself was not lengthy, and it was not 
contradictory. There were only three eye witnesses at the 
scene: the plaintiff, the defendant, and Raymond Ward, who 
was following the defendant in another vehicle. 
The accident occurred at about 6:30 o'clock p.m. on 
February 7, 1976, on Sunnyside Avenue at Guardsman Way. 
Sunnyside Avenue is a wide street (about 70 feet where plaintiff 
was crossing) and has marked traffic lanes, left turn lanes, 
and pedestrian lanes. It is marked for two lanes of travel 
in each direction, and there are mercury vapor street lights 
at the intersection (Ex. 1-P) . 
Just before the accident, Raymond W. Ward was driving 
west down Sunnyside, approximately four to five car lengths 
behind the defendant's vehicle (R 155). It was early dusk 
on a clear day, still quite light (R 154). Ward could see 
through the rear window and windshield of defendant's auto-
mobile, and through her windows observed that there was a 
pedestian in the way almost directly in front of defendant. 
He knew that the pedestrain would be hit if defendant didn't 
apply her brakes immediately. By the time the car struck 
- 5 -
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the plaintiff, he had walked a few more steps since Ward had 
first seen him. The car hit the pedestrain and boosted him 
over to the right of the road where he landed at the curb 
line (R 155). When ward first observed him, plaintiff was 
on the north or destination side of the road. He was struck 
at a point approximately six feet from the curb. The witness 
did not see any sign of brakes being applied by the defendant 
until after the plaintiff was struck, nor did he notice the 
car slow down (R 156). The witness and the defendant were 
both going at a rate of about 35 to 40 miles per hour (R 
157). When Ward first observed him, plaintiff was four or 
five car lengths in front of the defendant's car and didn't 
seem to be aware that the car was bearing down on him. He 
was walking at a medium to fast gait (R 162-163). 
The defendant testified both by deposition and in 
person. She was driving by herself, west on Sunnyside 
Avenue, saw a pedestrian in the crosswalk and swerved to the 
left and behind him, hitting him with her right headlight. 
She was in the right-hand lane of westbound traffic and she 
guessed about 50 feet from plaintiff when she first saw him. 
She said she was traveling at about 30 miles per hour (R 
183). She didn't apply the brakes before hitting him, but 
only swerved. Contrary to Ward's testimony, she stated that 
she had her headlights on at the time, on low beam. When 
she first saw plaintiff, he was in the middle of the right-
- 6 -
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hand lane, the one in which she was traveling. There was no 
traffic to impede her and she attempted to swerve left 
toward the middle lane. Plaintiff was in the middle of the 
right-hand lane when she hit him (R 184) at the right head-
light of her automobile. Plaintiff was then about five feet 
from the curb (R 185) and in the crosswalk when defendant 
hit him. She drove along Sunnyside Avenue on a daily basis 
and was aware of the existence of the crosswalks in that 
area (R 186). At the time of the accident she was in the 
northern lane of the westbound traffic (R 322). It was 
dark, she said, and she had her headlights on low beam (R 
322). She was traveling at about 30 miles per hour. 
Although she testified that plaintiff was about 50 feet away 
when she first observed him, she testified on cross-examination 
that she was just entering the intersection at about the 
eastern crosswalk (R 326) -- a distance of about 85 feet 
from where she hit plaintiff. The intersection was lighted 
by street lights (R 327). 
The plaintiff testified that he was a student at the 
University of Utah, and on the evening of February 7 he was 
walking to the University to see a film. He was walking 
north along Greenwood Terrace, reached the corner of Green-
wood Terrace and Sunnyside Avenue, stopping at the curb to 
look for traffic to his left. As he reached the curb, he 
let two cars ~ass him, then proceeded north across Sunnyside, 
- 7 -
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glancing to the right. He saw a car some distance away 
approaching from the east, but he believed it to be far 
enough away and moving slowly enough that he could cross the 
street with safety. The next thing he remembered was having 
been struck and lying on the ground (R 192, 222). After 
being struck he was in and out of consciousness, lying 
partly in the road. He testified that he may have sensed 
his danger a split second before impact (R 222). After 
being taken to the hospital, he gained and lost consciousness 
repeatedly (R 224), and after some delay was sedated and 
given a pain killer (R 225). 
At plaintiff's typical stride, there were about 28 
paces from curb to curb on Sunnyside. It took him about 
eight seconds to reach the median line on Sunnyside and 
about four seconds more to get to the line separating the 
two northern lanes (R 265), just south of where he was 
struck. 
The only other witness to testify concerning the events 
surrounding the accident was Artie Banks, Jr., a Salt Lake 
City police officer who investigated the accident. When he 
arrived at the scene, he observed the plaintiff at the curb 
and gutter, lying across the curb and gutter, the upper 
portion of his body approximately on the sidewalk, and the 
lower half on the roadway. He was conscious but in extreme 
pain (R 167). Banks talked to the defendant who told him 
that she did not see plaintiff until it was too late, and 
- 8 -
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that she attempted to move away from his direction by 
turning the wheel, but was unsuccessful (R 168). The point 
of impact was near the center or right of center in the 
crosswalk in the far "right-handmost lane". The distance 
from point of impact to where plaintiff was lying was approxi-
mately 20 feet. He had been struck by the right front 
fender and bumper. Banks testified that he talked to plain-
tiff later in the hospital, and that plaintiff told him that 
he had reached approximately the midpoint of the intersection, 
had seen a vehicle coming and attempted to sprint across the 
roadway, making it as far as the right-hand lane, and at 
that point he saw that the vehicle was going to continue and 
tried to jump out of the way (R 169). (This version, if 
told to Banks at all, was told while plaintiff was in and 
out of consciousness, in great pain, and probably drugged. 
It is inconsistent with the descriptions of the three 
persons who were there.) 
In addition to giving customary instructions on negli-
gence, the court instructed the jury specifically with 
respect to the relative duties of pedestrians and motor 
vehicle operators. Among the instructions given were the 
following: 
A driver of a motor vehicle has a duty not to 
drive the vehicle on a highway at a speed gre~ter 
then is reasonable and prudent under the condL-
tions, and having regard to the actual.and poten-
tial hazards then existing, and speed LS to be.so 
controlled as may be necessary to avoid collLdLng 
- 9 -
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with any person, vehicle or other conveyance on or 
entering the highway, in compliance with legal 
requirements and the duty of all persons to use 
due care. The statutes also require that the 
driver of a vehicle shall, consistent with the 
foregoing, drive at an appropriate reduced speed 
when approaching and crossing an intersection, or 
when special hazards exist with respect to pedes-
trians or other traffic, or by reason of weather 
or highway conditions. (R 53) 
A driver of a motor vehicle is required to yield 
the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping if 
necessary to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing 
the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian 
is upon the half of the roadway upon which the 
vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is 
approaching so closely from the opposite half of 
the roadway as to be in danger. 
The person having the right-of-way may assume that 
the other will yield. Failure of defendant to so 
yield the right-of-way to plaintiff would constitute 
negligence on defendant's part, if you so find. (R 
54) 
It is the duty of every operator of a motor vehicle 
to exercise ordinary care and keep a careful 
lookout ahead and about him. The exercise of 
ordinary care requires him to make observations at 
a point or points where his observations will be 
efficient for protection from injury to persons or 
property, requires a seasonable and effective use 
of a driver's sense of sight to observe timely, 
not only the presence, location and movement of 
other users of the highway, pedestrians as well as 
vehicles, but traffic signs and signals, obstruc-
tions to vision, and everything else with might 
warn him of possible danger. (R 55) 
Before attempting to cross a street that is being 
used for the traffic of motor vehicles, it is a 
pedestrian's duty to make reasonable observations 
to learn the traffic conditions confronting him; 
to look to that vicinity from which, were a 
vehicle approaching, it would immediately endanger 
his passing; and to make the determination which a 
reasonably prudent person would make under the 
same circumstances as to whether it is reasonably 
- 10 -
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safe to attempt the crossing. What observations 
he should make, and what he should do for his own 
safety, while crossing the street are matters 
which the law does not attempt to regulate in 
detail and for all occasions, except in this 
respect: it places upon him the continuing duty 
to exercise the care a reasonably prudent person 
would observe to avoid an accident. (R 58) 
In determining whether the plaintiff was negligent 
with respect to his own safety, you may take into 
account the fact that a pedestrian crossing a busy 
street must be constantly vigilant for his safety 
with respect to all of the conditions around him, 
and that even if a car is seen approaching, unless 
it is so positioned as to constitute an immediate 
hazard to him, he is not necessarily obliged to 
focus full and undivided attention on that particu-
lar car and so calculate his entire conduct as to 
avoid being struck by it. He need not anticipate 
that the driver will speed, fail to observe, fail 
to control her car, fail to afford him the right: 
of way, or otherwise be negligent unless, in the 
exercise of ordinary care, he observes or should 
have observed something to warn him of such im-
proper conduct. (R 59) 
Although inconsistent in some minor respects, the 
instructions were substantially correct, and no exceptions 
were taken to them. 
Under the law, and under the court's instructions, 
there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that 
the plaintiff was as negligent as the defendant, and the 
trial court should have granted plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial. Where a motion for a new trial has been granted or 
denied, this court may review the evidence for the purpose 
of determining whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in ruling on the motion. Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric 
- 11 -
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Association, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393, 396 (1970); 
Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 98 P. 300, 305 (1908). 
We are not unmindful of the cases in which this court 
has stated that it will not reverse an order granting or 
denying a motion for a new trial unless there has been a 
clear abuse of discretion, but most cases have dealt with 
situations in which the court granted a motion for a new 
trial, such as in King v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
117 Utah 40, 212 P.2d 692 (1949); and Brown v. Johnson, 24 
Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d 942 (1970). 
In Moser v. ZCMI, 114 Utah 58, 197 P.2d 136 (1948) the 
court did consider a ruling of the trial court denying a 
motion for a new trial, and said: 
The rule in this jurisdiction, early laid down by 
this court, is that where a motion for a new trial 
is based upon insufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict, the trial court will not be 
held to have abused this discretion in denying the 
motion unless there is no substantial evidence in 
the record to support the verdict. 
Therefore, if reasonable minds could have found as 
the jury did in this case, from the evidence before 
it, then we cannot say that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for 
a new trial on the grounds of this insufficiency 
of the evidence to support the verdict. 
Cases on the scope of appellate review of orders 
granting motions for new trial do not provide much guidance 
with respect to appellate review of orders denying motions 
for new trial. As said in Olson v. Thompson, 74 N.W. 2d 432 
(N.D. 1956): 
- 12 -
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Orders granting new trials, on ground of insuf-
ficency of evidence, stand on a firmer toundation 
in a reviewing court then orders denying new 
trials, since such orders are not decisive of the 
case, but only open the way to reinvestigation of 
the entire case on its facts and merits. 
See also Pacta v. Kleppe Corporation, 154 N.w. 2d 177, 
183 (N.D. 1967). 
Moreover, the restrictions appellate courts have 
placed upon themselves in reviewing evidence are of doubtful 
worth in connection with apportionment of negligence by 
trial juries under comparative negligence statutes. Some 
courts in administering comparative negligence statutes have 
seen the need for more judicial supervision of the ~'-~r:.r's 
findings. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence Manual, § 1050, 
comments favorably upon the granting of a new trial by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, even where ordinary procedures had 
not been followed: 
The Graff case [Graff v. Gerber, 26 Wis.2d 72, 131 
N.W.2d 866 (1954)] shows the versatility of the 
comparative law concept. The trial technique 
illustrates the effort to avoid repeated litiga-
tion. When the supervision of the trial court 
over the jury's verdict and the supervision of the 
Supreme Court over the trial court's decision in 
the interests of justice are combined, the chances 
there are lessened. 
This ingenious concept preserves the adversary 
system and jury trials, and avoids the evils of 
passion and prejudice and the desire of the jury 
to see one side either win or loss. The jury 
should be purely a fact finding body. While the 
concept is not perfect, one must conclude that ~t 
is a giant step forward in solving the legal 
uncertainties of the accident victim. No quarrel 
- 13 -
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can be had with the goal of making each tortfeasor 
pay for the wrong he committed. No quarrel can be 
had with evaluating the damages caused to each 
accident victim by a fair and reasonable standard 
of proof. No quarrel can be had with a procedure 
that has built in supervision in the event of 
error or injustice to any party. 
The state of Wisconsin has been a leader in the compara-
tive negligence field, and its courts have shown leadership 
in exercising necessary controls and supervision over errant 
juries. 
Loomans v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Company, 38 Wis. 
2d 656, 158 N.W. 2d 318 (1968~ arose out of an automobile 
accident in which the plaintiff slowed her car suddenly, 
having observed an accident ahead, skidded, and was struck 
by the defendant's automobile, which had been following 
behind her. The jury apportioned 60% percent of the cause 
of negligence to the plaintiff and 40% to the defendant. 
The trial court granted a motion for a new trial, but failed 
to follow the required procedure. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, on review, exercised its discretionary power to grant 
a new trial. Discussing the comparison of negligence ques-
tion, and the reason for granting the new trial, the court 
said: 
It is contended by the defendant that the com-
parison of negligence is peculiarly for the jury 
and therefore cannot be upset or be a basis for 
granting a new trial in the interest of justice. 
This is an erroneous view. While it may not be 
often that this court upsets a comparison of 
negligence, the court has done so as a matter of 
law and reversed for error. A comparison may also 
- 14 -
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be the basis of a new trial in the interest of 
justice when the comparison is against the great 
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence 
although this court cannot as a matter of law say 
that it was wrong. [Citations omitted.] 
In the instant case, the trial court believed the 
comparison was wrong and the plaintiff Edma Loomans' 
negligence could not be equal to or greater than 
that of the defendant Lewin's but the court granted 
the new trial on the ground of interest of justice. 
It might have been placed on the ground of error. 
In Korleski v. Lane, 10 Wis.2d 163, 102 N.W.2d 234 (1960), a 
jury had returned a verdict of 50% causal negligence on the 
part of plaintiff, a motion for new trial had been denied, 
and judgment had been entered on the verdict. On appeal the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and ordered a new trial 
in the interest of justice. 
In Spath v. Sereda, 41 Wis. 2d 448, 164 N.W. 2d 246 
(1969), the court held that where the jury findings were 
contrary to the great weight of evidence, even though 
supported by credible evidence, a new trial might be granted 
in the interest of justice, and that the rule applied alike 
to questions of damages, negligence, causation, and compari-
son of negligence. See also Pruss v. Strube, 37 Wis.2d 539, 
155 N.W.2d 650 (1968). 
Wisconsin differs from Utah in that it has a statute 
permitting its supreme court to grant a new trial "in the 
interest of justice," and Utah does not. But this court has 
recognized that denial of a motion for new trial may be 
reversed if it constituted an abuse of discretion, and there 
- 15 -
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is no reason why this court may not determine as a matter of 
common law that there is an abuse of discretion if the 
decision of the trial court results in a miscarriage of 
justice. "Abuse of discretion" is a term of uncertain 
meaning. In Whiteman v. Pitrie, 220 F.2d 914, 919 (1955), 
the court stated: 
lfuat are the tests for such abuse of discretion? 
* * * When all is said and done, however, the 
question by its very nature is one for which there 
can be no rule of thumb answer. Attempts at 
defining or making more certain and exact the 
tests of abuse of discretion do not usually 
furnish reliable guide posts, nor tend to clarify 
the rule. 
Under any test, or any approach, the judgment should be 
reversed in thls case because of the trial court's failure 
to grant the new trial. 
As pointed out above, this was not a case in which the 
evidence was in conflict in any material points, and the 
presumption given to the validity of the trial court's 
rulings should apply only to those parts of a trial in which 
personal presence and personal observation are of impor-
tance. When controlling facts are not in dispute, the scope 
of this court's review should be greater. A case in point 
is American Life Insurance Company v. Williams, 234 Ala. 
469, 175 So. 554, 112 A.L.R. 1215, 1218 (1937), which 
involved the question of whether the insured had died of a 
pulmonary disease, in which event the policy would not have 
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covered the death. The defendant had sought a new trial 
after a verdict for the plaintiff, but it was denied. The 
court said: 
The next question is whether the motion for a new 
trial should have been granted because it was 
against the great weight of the evidence. When 
such a motion is denied by the trial court, and 
the verdict is largely dependent upon the credi-
bility of the witnesses, to reverse the judgment 
on that motion the weight of the evidence must be 
so strong that there can be no reasonable doubt 
but that the verdict was the result of passion, 
prejudice, bias, favor, or some other motive which 
should not be controlling. [Citations omitted] 
The same is true in respect to matters in the 
discretion of the jury. [Citation omitted] 
But when the evidence is without dispute in material 
respects, and the question hinges on a proper 
interpretation of it, the rule is different, 
whether at law or in equity. (Citations omitted] 
Another case recognizing limitations on the trial 
court's discretion is Dolson v. Anastasia, 5 N.J. 2, 258 
Atl.2d 706 (1969), a motor vehicle rear-end collison case in 
which the jury had returned a verdict of no cause of action 
and plaintiff had moved for a new trial on the ground that 
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The 
trial court denied the motion, and the appellate division 
felt compelled to affirm the trial court's order in light of 
what it considered its limited review power. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court reversed noting the differences between a 
motion for a new trial after a jury verdict as against the 
weight of the evidence, a motion for involuntary dismissal, 
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a motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence, and 
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It pointed 
out that the tests in those latter types of motions are 
different from the one in case of a motion for a new trial 
as against the weight of the evidence, and said: 
The standard governing an appellate tribunal's 
review of a trial court's action on a new trial 
motion is essentially the same as that controlling 
the trial judge. Hager v. Weber, 7 N.J. 201, 212, 
81 Atl.2d 155 (1951) very correctly so held, at 
the same time putting to rest all constitutional 
questions and casting aside any more restrictive 
"abuse of discretion test." We say the test is 
"essentially the same", because where certain 
aspects are important--witness credibility, 
"demeanor", "feel of the case", or other criteria 
which are not transmitted by the written record--, 
the appellate court must give deference to the 
views of the trial judge thereon. His decision, 
however, is not entitled to any special deference 
where it rests upon a determination as to worth, 
plausibility, consistency or other tangible consider-
ations apparent from the face of the record with 
respect to which he is no more peculiarly situated 
to decide than the appellate court. * * * 
It consequently behooves the trial judges in 
deciding new trial motions to spell out fully the 
reasons for their determinations so that reviewing 
tribunals may be advised of the extent to which 
factors entitled to deference entered into the 
decision. 
In this case the trial judge did not spell out his 
reasons, and there were no factors that were entitled to 
this court's deference. The evidence of the three eye 
witnesses to the accident establish the physical facts 
without serious dispute. The plaintiff was crossing a wide 
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street, approximately 70 feet from curb to curb. The 
defendant was proceeding down a wide street that was marked 
with four travel lanes. She was in the most right hand 
lane, the one nearest to the north curb, and the one far-
thest from the point at which plaintiff had left the curb. 
When the impact occurred, the plaintiff was in the middle of 
the northernmost lane, approximately 65 feet from where he 
had left the curb and about 6 feet from being safely across. 
He was first seen by defendant when he was about in the 
middle of her car, which was in the middle of the far right 
lane. The speed of his gait and the speed of the automobiles, 
whether as testified to by defendant or by the witness 
Raymond Ward, were such that when the plaintiff left the 
middle of the mid-point of the roadway and stepped into the 
half of the roadway in which defendant was driving her 
automobile, the defendant must have been in a position that 
would have permitted her to stop, or at least to slow enough 
to permit the plaintiff to reach a point of safety. She did 
not stop. She did not attempt to stop. She did not slow or 
attempt to slow, but took the easy way, hoping to miss him 
without impeding her journey to the library. 
And the plaintiff was visible. Ward saw him through 
defendant's automobile when the plaintiff was four to five 
car lengths in front of defendant's automobile, and defendant's 
automobile was four or five car lengths in front of Mr. \liard. 
- 19 -
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If she was traveling at a rate of 30 miles per hour, as she 
said, she would have been moving at a rate of 44 feet per 
second and if she was just entering the intersection, as she 
said, at the pedestrian crosswalk on the east side of the 
intersection, she would have had two seconds within which to 
apply her brakes and take evasive action. She would not 
have had to slow much, because the plaintiff was within 
inches of safety when he was struck by her right headlight. 
As the court instructed the jury, the plaintiff had a 
right to assume that the defendant would slow or would stop 
and permit him to proceed across the street, and this is 
true whether or not he saw the defendant's vehicle. The 
jury must have been overly impressed by the fact that the 
plaintiff didn't see the oncoming car, and while the failure 
to see may have been negligence, it was not a cause of the 
accident, because if he had seen the vehicle, he would have 
had the right to assume it would yield the right-of-way to 
him. In Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680, 685 
(1954), an auto-pedestian case, the court discussed the 
causation question. 
This court has on numerous occasions dealth with 
that principle. In the case of Lowder v. Holley 
[233 P.2d 350, 352] defendants strenuously urged 
that the admitted failure of plaintiff Lowder to 
see defendant's truck approaching the intersection 
made plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law which precluded his recovery. 
But the court, through Mr. Justice Wade, made very 
clear the thought above expressed, reasoning that 
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because, the evidence was susceptible of a finding 
that when plaintiff stopped at the intersection 
the approaching truck was far enough away to have 
afforded plaintiff an opportunity to safely cross, 
that the plaintiff "* * * could have assumed and 
acted on the assumption that the driver of the 
truck would exercise ordinary and reasonable care 
in his driving and that it would be safe to cross 
the intersection. * * * Under such a state of 
facts Amasa Lowder's failure to see the truck 
could in no way have contributed to the accident." 
(Emphasis added.) In other words, even if he had 
seen the approaching truck, it could have been 
found, consistent with due care for plaintiff to 
assume that he would be afforded his right-of-way 
because of entering the intersection first, and 
proceed across. So the accident might well have 
happened just as it did, whether Lowder saw the 
defendant or not. 
Moreover, assuming that both plaintiff and defendant 
were somewhat inattentive, and the inattention of each was 
a cause of the accident, this does not legitimize a SO-SO 
apportionment. The differing duties of the motorist on the 
one hand and the pedestrian on the other were observed by 
this court in Coombs v. Perry, supra, 2 Utah 2d 381, 27S 
P. 2d 680, 682 (19S2) (19S4): 
It is to be borne in mind that although the 
motorist and pedestrian are both required to 
exercise the same standard of care, that of the 
ordinary prudent person under the circumstances, 
that standard imposes upon the motorist a greater 
amount of caution than upon the pedestrian because 
of the potential danger to others in the opera-
tions of an automobile. 
It is submitted that it was a miscarriage of justice, 
an abuse of discretion, an error in law, for the trial judge 
to let the judgments stand. 
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But, it may be argued, what of the testimony of Officer 
Banks? The answer is that his testimony should have no 
weight. It was contrary to the testimony of all three of 
the persons involved at the scene. Ward, who observed the 
accident through the defendant's automobile, did not see 
plaintiff sprint, but observed him walking at a medium to 
fast gait; the defendant took the stand and testified but 
said nothing about a sprint from the middle of the roadway; 
and the plaintiff himself testified that he became aware of 
the presence of the automobile only a instant before the 
impact. 
The defendant's testimony is important because she had 
the plaintiff barely moving--she said he was at the middle 
the right-hand lane when she first saw him and was in the 
middle when she hit him (R 184). He couldn't have been 
sprinting. Moreover, Banks spent only 5 minutes at the 
hospital with the plaintiff on the evening of the accident, 
when plaintiff was in and out of consciousness and under 
sedation. 
Banks' testimony, of course, was placed before the jury 
and may well have had some effect on its deliberations. The 
testimony varied from a statement previously given to plain-
tiff's counsel. On March 29, 1976, less than two months 
after the accident, Banks had stated: 
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After I had investigated the scene of the accident 
I went to the hospital and spoke with Robert 
Anderson. He was in severe pain but did indicate 
to me that he saw the car but could not get out of 
the way before it struck him. He was wearing 
light clothing, i.e., brown cords and a light 
colored jacket. 
The prior statement was pointed out to the trial judge 
in plaintiff's motion for a new trial, and while the sur-
prise, in itself, might not have been sufficient for the 
granting a new trial, it was one factor that contributed to 
a miscarriage of justice, along with the insufficiency of 
the evidence, and defense counsel's "shackle" remarks in his 
summation (R 364). 
CONCLUSION 
The jury made an error of such magnitude as to indicate 
that the jurors had either ignored or failed to understand 
the instructions given them by the trial judge. They failed 
to give consideration to the greater responsibility and duty 
of the driver of a motor vehicle, and they failed to recognize 
plaintiff's right-of-way and his right to rely on it. The 
jury's finding that plaintiff and defendant were each 50% 
negligent is not supported by the evidence, it is contrary 
to law, and it is contrary to the instructions given by the 
court. 
A motion for a new trial was made to the trial court on 
the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence, the sur-
prise resulting from the testimony of Officer Banks, and the 
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prejudice resulting from defense counsel's remarks about 
defendant's being "shackled" with a judgment. The jury 
verdict cannot be justified, and the court should have 
granted a new trial. Inasmuch as it did not do so, this 
court should remand the case with directions to grant a new 
trial, so that the plaintiff may receive some compensation 
for the serious injuries the defendant inflicted upon him. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/s/ Bryce E. Roe 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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